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Abstract
Although more rapid development is a primary motivation behind city-county consolidations,
few empirical studies explore the impact of consolidation on economic development. No studies
look at government consolidation in the United States using modern causal inference methods.
We use the synthetic control method (SCM) to examine the long-term impact of city-county
consolidations on per capita income, population, and employment. The results from the three
cases explored indicate that consolidation does not guarantee development and actually can
have negative effects. Additionally, consolidation can deepen the urban-rural divide by acceler-
ating the decline of rural populations relative to those of urban areas. The effects vary based
upon the county, time horizon and development measure. The results are robust to placebo test
simulations and counterfactuals constructed only from counties with earlier failed consolidation
attempts. Our results highlight how public choice considerations surrounding the implementa-
tion of governmental consolidations are crucial to outcomes and can help inform any subsequent
city-county consolidation attempts.
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1 Introduction
Although the United States has a rich history of multiple local governments, calls for consolidation
into regional forms of government increasingly are being heard. Reformers argue that consoli-
dated governments would improve the efficiency of public service delivery, solve equity problems,
internalize spillovers, and foster economic development. One of the most widely discussed forms
of local government consolidation is city-county merger. Although only 41 attempted city-county
consolidations in the United States since 1815 have been successful, attempts at city-county consol-
idations remain popular.1 In the wake of the Great Recession, city-county consolidations have been
seen as a way of economizing on government expenses and stimulating economic development.2
A current example is the planned consolidation of the city of Syracuse with Onondaga County in
upstate New York. A central motivation for consolidation is to foster economic development and
reverse the trends of a declining population and workforce by establishing a broader tax base and
a countywide land-use plan (Sugiyama 2017).
Although development routinely is cited as a motivation for consolidation, relatively little em-
pirical research explores the actual economic development impacts of city-county consolidations in
the US context. Among the small but growing literature are Feiock and Carr (1997), Carr and
Feiock (1999), Carr et al. (2006), and Faulk and Schansberg (2009), all of whom use time-series or
panel models to demonstrate that consolidation typically has no detectable effects on employment
or the number of businesses in operation. Outside the United States, Egger et al. (2018) look
at recent large-scale municipal mergers in Germany. Using satellite data on nighttime luminosity
to measure economic activity and a difference-in-difference approach, they find a net increase in
economic activity in the amalgamated jurisdictions. The use of nighttime luminosity in the govern-
mental consolidation context is an important innovation in the literature as it allows the authors
to observe how the spatial distribution of economic activity changed after merger. Historically,
such geographic distributional analysis is very difficult in US based studies because of limitations
on geo-coded economic data.3
1Martin and Schiff (2011) list 39 successful city-county consolidations as of 2011. According to our analysis of
the National Association of Counties’ information on “government structure,” that number is now 41. In terms of
attempts at consolidation, a search of “city-county consolidation” in Newsbank yields over 11,000 results.
2For a thorough treatment of the theoretical reasons for and against local government consolidations as well as an
analysis of the case-study evidence, see Hall et al. (2018).
3For readers unfamiliar with the use of nighttime luminosity to measure economic activity, the seminal paper is
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Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we are the first to employ the
synthetic control method (SCM) to study the economic development impacts of US city-county
consolidation.4 The model is well-suited for analyzing the impact of unique events, such as city-
county consolidations, over time. Recently, Roesel (2017) used SCM to study the effects of gov-
ernment mergers on expenditures in Germany and finds no economies of scale. However, to our
knowledge we are the first to use the SCM to look at the effect of city-county consolidations on eco-
nomic outcomes. Second, selection into “treatment” always is a concern in causal inference. In our
Georgia cases, we are able to compare consolidated governments with others holding consolidation
referendums that failed. The fact that our results using such “nearly merged” counties to construct
the donor pool are similar to our larger donor pool, mitigates against concerns about selection
into treatment that other case study approaches have difficulty addressing.5 Third, we provide
descriptive evidence of how the politics of city-county consolidation pre-treatment contributes to
its ineffectiveness. A better understanding of the actual development impacts of city-county consol-
idations – and the public choice issues associated with their passage – contributes to the academic
discussion and informs local and state government policymakers considering consolidation.
2 Context
2.1 Theory
Proponents of local government consolidation highlight three reasons why consolidation promotes
economic development. First, consolidation improves the comprehensive planning capacity of local
governments and reduces socially inefficient competition. Larger governments can establish a spe-
cialized department focusing on economic development, which improves coordination and expertise
(Fleischmann and Green 1991). Rather than smaller governments competing with each other, a
single larger government can facilitate cooperation between different regions. Second, consolida-
by Henderson et al. (2012). Digital satellite data exist from 1992 onwards and thus our three case studies are not
suitable for the approach used by Egger et al. (2018). However, in the results section, we consider how consolidation
affects the urban-rural divide by taking account of the rural-total population ratio.
4SCM is a generalization of the difference-in-differences model (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010).
While previous studies examine growth in consolidated counties to state-wide trends or comparison counties defined
in ad hoc ways, the SCM systematically identifies a comparison case by weighting all counties in a state based upon
a set of key predictor variables of development.
5We are indebted to a referee for highlighting that point for us. When using the SCM, the donor pool is a group
of similar regions from which the synthetic counterfactual is created but which did not receive the intervention.
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tion simplifies the regulatory process. The result is less uncertainty and lower transaction costs for
business activity (Carr and Feiock 1999). For example, instead of having to obtain permits from
multiple government agencies, with a unified government, a business deals with a single agency
(Feiock and Carr 1997). Third, consolidation allows for large regional development projects. If the
costs of a large development project are borne within the boundaries of a city but the benefits spill
over to a larger region, projects that are socially optimal will not be undertaken (Feiock et al. 1993).
Additionally, consolidation expands the local tax base, which helps in financing large development
projects such as mass transit systems and sports stadiums (Feiock and Carr 1997).
Although consolidation is argued to promote development, fragmentation could have the same
effects if it creates competition, takes better advantage of local knowledge, or both (Vihanto 1992;
Tullock 1994; Stansel 2012). Kim and Jurey (2013) summarize the chain of events linking govern-
mental fragmentation and development. First, fragmented governments promote interjurisdictional
competition (Tiebout 1956), a key theme in early public choice work on fragmentation and con-
solidation (Ostrom 1969; Wagner and Weber 1975; Premus 1977). Second, under competitive
pressure, each jurisdiction seeks to reduce tax burdens while providing attractive amenities and
reducing waste.6 Lastly, the appealing combination of low taxes and valuable services draws in new
businesses and residents, which increases the growth rate for jobs, population and income.7
In addition to the theoretical literature regarding fragmentation versus consolidation, an extant
literature studies the drivers of consolidation. That vast and important literature explores the con-
ditions necessary for consolidation to be a subject of discussion among policymakers and citizens.
Early work by Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) noted that most consolidations began with a
“crisis climate” associated with some imminent problem such as a lack of development, population
decline, or other civic issue. At its core, however, Rosenbaum and Kammerer (1974) argues that
crisis only triggers effort to get a consolidation referendum on the ballot (Leland and Thurmaier
2004). Later work then expanded the crisis model by letting agenda setters, such as civic elites,
to play larger roles in the process (Feiock and Carr 2000). A seminal paper that combines many
of the arguments is Leland and Thurmaier (2005). They introduce the C3 model (City-County
6Martin and McKenzie (1975) present a theoretical model wherein the benefits from consolidation will be captured
by the bureaucracy of the newly consolidated government.
7While we see our exercise as primarily empirical in this paper, we would highlight the deep and rich public
choice tradition of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom with respect to the public choice issues surrounding consolidation and
jurisdictional fragmentation (Ostrom et al. 1961; Ostrom 2010; Lowery 2013; Aligica 2015).
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Consolidation), which brought together the relevant literature into an overarching framework that
emphasizes the institutional and legal setting in which consolidation is attempted. Another advan-
tage of their model is the way in which it highlights the role that consolidation-charter provisions
play in mobilizing interest groups. That literature, including more recent papers such as Goodman
and Leland (2013), focuses on the process of consolidation and what drives success or failure in
implementation. As such, it informs our understanding of why all city-county consolidations might
not be created equal. This literature also highlights concerns about selection in consolidation.
2.2 Empirics
Ultimately, the effect of city-county consolidations on economic development is an empirical ques-
tion that can be understood through the lens of theory (Mitchell and Boettke 2017).8 The first
paper to examine the economic development impact of a city-county consolidation empirically over
time is Feiock and Carr (1997). They use an interrupted time series design to analyze growth in the
number of manufacturing, retail and service establishments both before and after the Jacksonville-
Duval County consolidation in Florida. Their results suggest that consolidation had no impact
on growth in any sector. Expanding on their previous work, Carr and Feiock (1999) assess the
development impacts of nine city-county consolidations between 1967 and 1984. Using the same
time series approach, they find no evidence of growth more rapid than statewide trends in the
number of manufacturing, retail and service establishments. With nine different cases, they are
able to conclude that consolidation’s non-impact on economic development is not sensitive to the
extent of consolidation or differences between large and small metropolitan areas.
Subsequent research on governmental consolidation has expanded to include different sizes of
businesses, employment and payrolls. Using an interrupted time series approach, Carr et al. (2006)
find no effect of the Louisville-Jefferson County and the Lexington-Fayette County consolidations
in Kentucky on employment and payroll for different-sized firms in the manufacturing, retail and
service sectors. Most recently, Faulk and Schansberg (2009) use a panel-data approach and find
that consolidation in the Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia, Kansas City-Wyandotte County,
8Our discussion here is only about the literature on the economic development or growth impacts of city-county
consolidation. A large related literature exists that looks at the effect of government consolidation on governmental
costs (Allers and Geertsema 2016; Blesse and Baskaran 2016; Fahey et al. 2016; Swianiewicz and  Lukomska 2019),
expenditures (Roesel 2017), and political power (Harjunen et al. 2019).
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Kansas, and Lafayette City-Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, cases did not yield statistically significant
impacts on employment or the number of businesses in operation. Leland and Thurmaier (2010)
is an excellent collection of case studies of city-county consolidation in the US context with a
focus on seeing if reforms led to the promised outcomes. In general, the studies in Leland and
Thurmaier (2010) support the view that efficiency gains in government often are not achieved, but
economic development benefits are realized. Although the existing empirical literature differs from
the present paper by using time series or panel methods instead of the synthetic control method
(except for Egger et al. (2018)), we investigate the same city-county consolidations. Understanding
the context of each consolidation is important for interpreting the synthetic control results.
2.3 Major city-county consolidation cases
The three consolidations examined are Lafayette-Lafayette Parish (Louisiana), Athens-Clarke County
(Georgia), and Augusta-Richmond County (Georgia). Our selection criteria for cases studied fo-
cused on city-county consolidations that occurred in the 1990s. We focused on this period so that
we had sufficient time to observe the long-term impacts of consolidation while still having enough
data available for the pre-treatment period. This resulted in five cases: Lafayette-Lafayette Parish
(LA), two in Georgia (Athens-Clarke County and Augusta-Richmond),, Kansas City-Wyandotte
County (Kansas) and Louisville-Jefferson County (Kentucky). The latter two are excluded from our
analysis as those counties have the largest populations in their states and are sufficiently different
that the SCM is not able to generate an appropriate synthetic.
2.3.1 Lafayette-Lafayette Parish, Louisiana
Figure 1 shows that Lafayette Parish is located in south-central Louisiana and is the second smallest
parish in the state by land area. Lafayette Parish is substantially wealthier and more populous than
the average Louisiana parish (Table 1). The parish’s economic and population growth started in
the 1940s with the city’s ideal location for the petroleum industry. Since then, Lafayette’s economy
has diversified and become a regional technology and retail center. The push for consolidation was
not the result of a crisis climate (Leland and Thurmaier 2005). Instead, consolidation was viewed
as the practical next step in completing the ongoing process of expanding the city’s boundaries by
annexation.
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With support from the Greater Lafayette Chamber of Commerce and an overall positive outlook
for greater professionalism and growth opportunities in a consolidated government, the merger
between the city of Lafayette and Lafayette Parish passed by a wide margin in a popular referendum.
At the time of the consolidation referendum in 1992, the parish had a population of 171,468 and
the city a population of 106,977, 67% of Lafayette’s residents and 49% of the residents of Lafayette
Parish living outside the city limits supported the referendum.9 After the referendum passed,
a four-year transition period was set in motion until the consolidated government became fully
operational in 1996.
With consolidation, the City of Lafayette and Parish of Lafayette have a common representative
body and chief executive; both the city and unincorporated areas of the Parish receive most of
the same public services. However, some other unincorporated municipalities are not covered by
services’ contract. Meanwhile, zoning rules apply only in the City of Lafayette; other municipalities
in Lafayette Parish have their own planning and zoning protocols (Brand and Villavaso 2011). Some
suburban and rural cities and towns maintain their own independent city councils, local executives
and other public service providers such as police and fire departments.10 Owing to unbalanced
service provision, voters in the Parish have been seeking to re-separate the City and the Parish.
One unsuccessful proposal was debated in 2011, only to be rejected by the parish’s voters. However,
calls for governmental divorces are still ongoing.
2.3.2 Athens-Clarke County, Georgia
As shown in Figure 2, Clarke County is located in northeastern Georgia. Despite being the smallest
in area of Georgia’s 159 counties, it is one of Georgia’s most populous counties. At the time of the
consolidation referendum in 1990, the county had a population of 88,058 with the population split
about evenly between the city and unincorporated county areas (Fleischmann 2000; Durning et al.
2004). Many of the county’s residents are students at the University of Georgia and, as shown
in Table 2, the county has a substantially larger fraction of college graduates and government
9For additional details on the referendum, see Bacot (2004).
10“Cooperative Endeavor Agreement Between the Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government and the
Lafayette Parish School Board Concerning the Sharing of Costs Associated with the Alteration of District Bound-
aries”, see http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:63QSyRKnS3UJ:esbstaff.lpssonline.com/
attachments/de0d01b0-43d1-4833-b56d-7219cc39b6da.doc+&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us, accessed on May 20,
2019.
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employees than the average county in Georgia. With a growing university, the county has enjoyed
stable economic growth over time.
Unlike with the Lafayette, Louisiana, case, historically resistance to consolidating the city of
Athens and Clarke County has been evident. Consolidation referendums failed in 1966, 1969,
1972, and 1982. In order to ensure support from public employees in both the county and city
governments in 1990 and to expedite the consolidation process, the consolidation charter included
a provision guaranteeing that no public employee would lose his or her job. The provision also helped
ease tensions between the two governments, which had been escalating in recent years and was a
primary impetus for consolidation. Consolidation was viewed as a way to eliminate the competition
between the two governments in the provision of public services and promote cooperation instead.
The elimination of duplicate services was expected to increase efficiency and create an environment
more conducive to economic development. Overall, the push for consolidation did not follow a
crisis, but was supported by a desire for greater professionalism and good governance (Leland and
Thurmaier 2005).
With the pro-development outlook on consolidation, both business leaders and the Quality
Growth Task Force established by the local Chamber of Commerce were leading backers of the
consolidation. Support for the consolidation was divided evenly between city and unincorporated
residents, with 57.5% of city residents and 59.9% of unincorporated residents favoring the refer-
endum. The transition period was short, and the consolidated government became operational in
1991.
In Clarke County, two cities still retain separate governments: the City of Winterville and the
City of Bogart. The former is located entirely within Clarke County; the second one straddles
Clarke County’s border. In the 2010 census, Winterville had a population of 1,122; Bogart a
population of 1,034. Those two cities account for only about 1.6% of the county’s total population,
even counting the population of the part of Bogart located outside of Clarke County.11
2.3.3 Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia
Richmond County is located in eastern Georgia on its border with South Carolina (Figure 2). At
the time of the consolidation referendum in 1995, the county population was 200,027, with about
11US Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/, accessed on May 20, 2019.
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one-fourth of residents within Augusta’s city boundaries (Fleischmann 2000; Campbell et al. 2004).
Leading up to the referendum, the city of Augusta had been in decline for several decades. With
‘white flight’, wealthy white residents living in the city moved to suburbs in unincorporated areas of
Richmond County or to other counties. With the decline in population and changing demographics,
the city’s tax base was shrinking and bankruptcy was looming. Augusta’s severe financial crisis
was the primary impetus for the successful 1995 consolidation referendum. In addition to avoiding
bankruptcy and the subsequent service cuts and layoffs, consolidation was pursued in order to
eliminate duplication of services and improve their overall quality.
Prior to the successful consolidation, four failed referendums had been held between 1971 and
1988. Thus, as with the Athens-Clarke County case, the 1995 consolidation charter ensured job
protection and wage equalization for public employees. In the midst of the crisis, the consolidation
referendum passed by a wide margin with 77% support among city voters and 62% support from
voters in unincorporated areas. As with the other Georgia case, the consolidated government was
implemented quickly and became fully operational the year after the referendum passed.
Two cities in southern Richmond County still remain separate governments: the City of Hephz-
ibah and the City of Blythe. As of the 2010 census, Hephzibah had a population of 4,011; Blythe a
population of 721. The two cities account for about 2.5% of the total population of the county.12 To
the best of our knowledge, the two Georgia cases include only a few unincorporated communities,
while the legislature, chief executive and public services cover both the cities and the incorporated
parts of the counties.
3 Synthetic Control Method
The Synthetic Control Method (SCM) invented by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and developed
further by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2015) is a unique empirical technique for inves-
tigating the specific effects of a particular social shock (e.g., Powell et al. (2017)) or institutional
change (e.g., Zhou (2018)). Government policy is a common shock, so following Abadie et al.
(2010), more recent research such as Marcus and Siedler (2015), Chaurey (2017) and Ross (2018)
continues to employ the SCM to evaluate the effects of a wide variety of government policies. The
12US Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/, accessed on May 20, 2019.
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SCM works by calculating a synthetic counterfactual that could not happen and has not happened
in the real world. The synthetic counterfactual is created by taking the weighted average of donor
regions selected from the donor pool, a group of similar regions that did not receive the intervention.
Formally, the synthetic control method finds the optimal weights for each region in the donor pool
by minimizing
(X1 −X0W )′V (X1 −X0W ) (1)
where X1 is a (K × 1) vector of pretreated values of K economic growth predictors for the treated
region. X0 is a (K×J) matrix containing the values of the same variables for the J possible control
regions in the donor pool. V is a diagonal matrix with nonnegative components, and the values
of the diagonal elements of V reflect the relative importance of the different growth predictors.
The weights vector W ∗ is chosen to minimize Equation 1, subject to wj ≥ 0(j = 1, 2, ..., J) and∑J
j=1wj = 1. The weights vector W
∗ defines the combination of all other regions in the donor
pool (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). More specifically, the social shock herein is city-county
consolidation, the treated region is a county with a successful consolidation, and the treated year
is the year of voting on the consolidation referendum.
A tradeoff exists between overfitting and potentially unintended bias when selecting the donor
pool. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) mention that synthetic control results depend on the regions
which plausibly having economic characteristics similar to the one receiving a specific intervention;
Abadie et al. (2015) also emphasize that restricting the donor pool could help avoid interpolation
biases. Another important reason to restrict the donor pool is to avoid overfitting (Grier and
Maynard 2016). However, at the same time, donor pool selection might lead to unintended bias. In
our research, we choose all other counties within the same state, but not experiencing consolidation,
as the control regions in the donor pool.13 Using a large number of counties within the donor pool
follows Munasib and Rickman (2015), who analyze the shale gas and oil boom using the SCM.
Limiting the donor pool to counties within the same state is consistent with Faulk and Schansberg
13Another trade-off with donor pool selection is between having an appropriate comparison group and potential
spillover effects (Gobillon and Magnac 2016). Areas adjacent to the treated region are natural controls, but could
experience spillover effects from the treated region. For example, if consolidation leads to better economic development
prospects, businesses and residents in surrounding counties could move to the newly consolidated jurisdiction. That
effect would violate the SCM’s assumption that the shock affects the treated region only. Thus, following Pfeifer
et al. (2018), who drop from the donor pool municipalities directly adjacent to their treated regions, in addition to
our main results, we also conduct an analysis with counties adjacent to the consolidated counties excluded from the
donor pool. The results are comparable.
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(2009), who include same-state counties as the comparison group in their panel model. As they
point out, local government functions and structures are at the state government level and, thus,
vary across states. Therefore, including only counties within the same state ensures comparable
local governments between the county under consideration and counties in the donor pool.
Furthermore, in order to avoid mistaking random differences as real effects, a placebo test is
necessary. The test investigates other counties not experiencing the consolidation shock by the
same method and then checks whether it has a similar “treated effect” or not, but excluding the
treated region from their donor pools (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Abadie et al. 2010). Since the
population scale of every county within the same state varies, the difference between a county and
its synthetic counterfactual rather than the absolute difference may provide a better comparison.
Therefore, inspired by Adhikari and Alm (2016), we calculate a comparable difference by dividing
the absolute population difference by the synthetic counterfactual.
4 Data
Data for the outcome variables of total employment, per capita personal income, and population are
collected at the county level for each year between 1970 and 2010 from the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Per capita personal income is adjusted for inflation and is transformed into real
2010 dollars. In addition to the outcome variables, we collected data for three types of predictor
variables in order to construct the synthetic control.
First, following the literature on city and county growth, such as Leichenko (2001), Higgins
et al. (2006) and Duranton and Puga (2014), we include the following demographic variables: the
percentages of the adult population completing a four-year college degree, foreign born, black,
white, 65 years old or older. The stock of college graduates is especially relevant as Glaeser and
Saiz (2004) demonstrate that the proportion of college graduates living in a city is a strong predictor
of income, productivity, and population growth. Additionally, the fraction of foreign born persons
is relevant as Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find that wages and productivity tend to be higher in
more diverse cities (in terms of residents’ countries of origin). The observations on demographic
variables all come from the Census Bureau’s decennial census and, thus, are available only every
10 years. In order to have complete data for every year, we use simple linear interpolation for the
10
years between censuses.
The second set of predictor variables capture the natural and rural-urban environments. The
natural amenity attractiveness of counties explains a substantial amount of the variations in county-
level employment and population growth (McGranahan 1999). Thus, we collected data from the
US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Economic Research Service (ERS) Natural Amenities
Scale. The scale accounts for the natural amenities that most people prefer, such as warm and
sunny winters, mild and low-humidity summers, proximity to water and topographic variation.
Since natural amenities change little over time, each county’s score remains the same throughout
our sample. We also include each county’s rural-urban continuum code from the ERS because
measures of urbanization and proximity to urban areas are associated with differences in income
levels (Partridge et al. 2009) and population changes (Partridge et al. 2008). The ERS’s rural-urban
continuum code is well suited for controlling for such effects because it captures both population
levels and adjacency to metropolitan areas. The rural-urban continuum code was updated in 1974,
1983, 1993, and 2003. To avoid missing observations, each non-reporting year is not a reporting
year is assigned the same value as the reported value from the corresponding decade. For example,
all years in the 1970s are assigned the reported value from 1974.
Lastly, following several other synthetic control papers, such as Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
and Munasib and Rickman (2015), we include variables to reflect industry composition. Using
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for 1970-2000 and North American Industrial Clas-
sification (NAICS) codes from 2001 through 2010, taken from the BEA, we enter the proportions
of people employed in the government, manufacturing and retail sectors. Several small counties do
not have sector data available for each year over the sample. After dropping those counties as well
as other consolidated counties, the donor pool for Georgia contains 120 counties while the donor
pool for Louisiana contains 48 counties.
Descriptive statistics for Lafayette and the other 48 Louisiana counties with complete data
available are reported in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Clarke, Richmond, and Georgia’s other
120 counties with complete data available are reported in Table 2.
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5 Results
5.1 Lafayette Parish (Louisiana)
The SCM results for Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, are reported in Figure 3. The figure shows pre-
consolidation and post-consolidation comparisons of actual-to-synthetic control per capita personal
income, population, and total employment estimates.14 As shown in Table 3, of the 48 counties
in the Louisiana donor pool, two counties contribute to the synthetic Lafayette for per capita per-
sonal income, five counties contribute to the synthetic Lafayette for population, and three counties
contribute to the synthetic Lafayette for total employment. Table 4 shows the predictor balances
between Lafayette County and our synthetics for each of the three economic development out-
comes. The relatively close fit between Lafayette and the synthetics during the pre-consolidation
years suggests that the synthetic Lafayette is an appropriate counterfactual for Lafayette. Actual
post-consolidation per capita personal income, population and total employment all exceed the syn-
thetic control estimates, suggesting that consolidation had a broadly positive impact on economic
development.
The placebo tests indicate strong evidence of consolidation’s positive effects in all three areas of
economic development. The placebo tests in percentages are shown in Figure 4.15 Each black line
is the difference between the actual and synthetic Lafayette Parish in terms of per capita personal
income, population and total employment. Each gray line represents the difference between the
respective donor county and its synthetic control in terms of the same three outcome variables.
Since in each case, the black line lies above the mass of gray lines centered around zero during
the post-consolidation period, strong evidence is found that consolidation had a positive effect on
development in Lafayette Parish measured both in magnitude and percentage terms.
One explanation for the development success of the Lafayette consolidation is with regional de-
velopment projects, which were discussed in the theory subsection. As described in Bacot (2004),
shortly after the consolidation, the new government was able to oversee a $229 million bond issue
for needed road and drainage improvements. Following consolidation, many infrastructure improve-
ments were undertaken, such as the $45 million Camellia Boulevard road and bridge project meant
14Although the consolidated government was not fully functional until 1996, the year of the referendum (1992) is
used as the treatment year because between 1992 and 1996, a transition to the consolidated government was underway.
15Placebo tests using absolute difference are similar and available for all consolidation cases in Appendix A.
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to reduce traffic congestion. More infrastructure spending following consolidation is consistent with
Sole´-Olle´ (2006), who finds evidence of spillovers arising from residents in neighboring jurisdictions
crowding into another jurisdiction’s facilities. In addition to benefitting from larger, regional infras-
tructure improvements that may not have been implemented without consolidation, Lafayette also
benefitted from improved governmental coordination. Instead of competing as separate jurisdic-
tions, the consolidated government became more successful in obtaining funding for projects from
state and federal governments (Bacot 2004). Another important explanation for the development
success of Lafayette, which will become more apparent after studying our two Georgia examples, is
that the relative popularity of consolidation resulted in a consolidation plan that largely was free
of rent-seeking.16
5.2 Clarke County (Georgia)
The SCM results for Clarke County, Georgia, are shown in Figure 5. The figure displays pre-
consolidation and post-consolidation comparisons of actual-to-synthetic control per capita personal
income, population and total employment estimates. As shown in Table 5, of the 120 counties in
the Georgia donor pool, seven counties contribute to the synthetic Clarke County for per capita
personal income, four counties contribute to the synthetic Clarke for population and six counties
contribute to the synthetic Clarke for total employment. Predictor balances for Clarke County are
presented in Table 6. The close fit between Clarke and the synthetics during the pre-consolidation
years suggests that the synthetic Clarke County is an appropriate counterfactual for acutal Clarke.
Post-consolidation actual levels for all three variables are below the synthetic control estimates,
suggesting that consolidation had a broadly negative impact on economic development.
However, the placebo tests provide only weak support for the proposition that the negative
effects are non-random. The placebo tests with percentages are shown in Figure 6. For population
and total employment, the black line is centered around zero in the middle of the distribution of
gray lines during the post-consolidation period. The takeaway is that for Clarke County no clear
evidence is found that consolidation had a non-random negative effect on population and total
employment in either magnitude or percentage terms. Weak evidence exists, however, supporting
the negative effect of consolidation on per capita personal income based on the placebo tests.
16For a detailed discussion of the politics and implementation of consolidation, see Bacot (2004).
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The lack of positive impacts is consistent with previous case-study research. In surveys of county
and city public employees both before and after consolidation, Durning (1995) reports that public
employees expected the consolidated government to be inferior in terms of efficiency and economic
growth and that their views worsened after the consolidation. Selden and Campbell (2000) find
that the government’s overall operating expenditures increased after consolidation, although certain
areas of government spending fell. That result should not be surprising, given that a study of the
history of Richmond’s consolidation efforts reveals that one of the primary revisions to the 1990
consolidation referendum from prior merger attempts was that “the 1990 charter promised that
local government employees would not lose jobs, salaries, or benefits as a result of consolidation”
(Durning 1995, p. 117). Our results are consistent with consolidation not leading to greater
efficiencies that would have spurred economic development, perhaps because of charter features
introduced to overcome opposition.
In addition to charter features inconsistent with efficiency gains, the transition to a consoli-
dated government provided political entrepreneurs with opportunities to expand their bureaucra-
cies. With the assurance of not having to fire any public-sector employees, departments sought
to add assistant director and division head positions (Condrey 1994). For example, the landscape
management division adopted an organizational structure with 22 supervisors for and agency of
fewer than 30 employees. Prior to consolidation, city and county bureaucratic lines were drawn
clearly. However, during and after the consolidation, political entrepreneurs reorganized their bu-
reaucracies to stake out the greatest possible share of power for their departments within the new
government. Instead of greater efficiencies that could have spurred development, consolidation led
to bureaucratic bloat. The results from the synthetic control method of either no effect or a neg-
ative effect of consolidation on economic development are consistent with previous findings of no
change or reductions in the efficiency of service provision.
5.3 Richmond County (Georgia)
The SCM results for Richmond County, Georgia, are shown in Figure 7. The figure depicts pre-
consolidation and post-consolidation comparisons of actual-to- synthetic control per capita personal
income, population and total employment estimates. As reported in Table 7, of the 120 counties
in the Georgia donor pool, five counties contribute to a synthetic Richmond County for per capita
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personal income, five counties contribute to the synthetic Richmond for population and five counties
contribute to the synthetic Richmond for total employment. Predictor balances are presented in
Table 8. A close fit is evident between Richmond and the synthetic during the pre-consolidation
years, except for the years immediately leading up to the referendum. Because of the severe financial
crisis preceding the referendum vote, that gap is expected. Overall, the pre-consolidation years for
actual Richmond and the synthetic Richmond match closely.
Post-consolidation levels for all three outcome variables fall below the synthetic control esti-
mates, suggesting that consolidation had a negative impact on economic development. However,
the negative impact of consolidation on per capita personal income was short-lived since the actual
Richmond returned to that of the synthetic within 10 years of consolidation.
The placebo tests indicate that the negative effects of consolidation on per capita income,
population and total employment vary in their dissimilarities from random effects. The placebo
tests with percentages are shown in Figure 8. No evidence exists that consolidation negatively
affected per capita personal income in a way that differs from a random process. However, strong
evidence is that consolidation impacted population levels negatively, along with some moderate
evidence for a negative impact on total employment.
The lack of supporting evidence for a positive effect of consolidation on economic development
in Richmond County is consistent with that of Taylor et al. (2017), who use an interrupted time
series approach to analyze the impact of consolidation in three cases, including the one at hand
here. They find that total government spending increased after consolidation, although not in a
statistically significant way. That should not be surprising given that the charter for the newly
combined city-county government “ensured that existing tax burdens, service levels, and debt
obligations for citizens of the city and county would be maintained” (Campbell et al. 2004, p. 209).
If the consolidated government did not improve public services to create an environment conducive
to more rapid development and it couldn’t cut costs, then economic development is unlikely to
happen.
In addition to the consolidation charter, uncertainty following consolidation also was not con-
ducive to growth for at least two reasons. First, uncertainty about how the bureaucracy would ad-
just prompted struggles for power. With the potential for losing influence within the consolidated
government, bureaucratic factions refused to make compromises (Eidson 2014). The predicted re-
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sult was gridlock. Without the political compromises of the past between clearly defined coalitions,
in the new government meetings lasted for hours, sometimes resulting in the first mayor of the
consolidated government falling asleep (Metro Spirit 2018).
In addition to power struggles, a second issue with uncertainty arose from the abuse of political
power. The uncertainty of the new political power structure, how to operate in it, and the tran-
sition away from existing structures of bureaucratic checks and balances led to mismanagement.
Davis (1999) describes the problems that led to a grand jury investigation three years after voting
for consolidation. With wider bureaucratic discretion, the new government purchased real estate
of questionable value, engaged in nepotism, and paid $5 million for waste water treatment to a
company actively contributing to political campaigns.
5.4 Failed consolidation attempts donor pool
The main results rely on donor pools comprising all other counties in the same state that are
not consolidated and for which data are complete. However, counties that consolidate may differ
in significant ways from counties that never attempt consolidation. In Leland and Thurmaier’s
(2005) analytical model, attempts to consolidate attempts can stem from crisis situations and
perceptions that existing political structures are incapable of promoting subsequent development.
Thus, including in the donor pools counties that never have attempted consolidation could produce
negatively biased effects of consolidation on development. The negative effects found in both
Georgia cases simply could be caused by ongoing and anticipated economic development problems
that other areas never attempting consolidation did not face.
In order to control for that potential bias, we repeat the analysis for Athens-Clarke County
and Augusta-Richmond County. We do not re-examine Lafayette, Louisian, because no failed
consolidation attempts ever took place in that state (Murphy 2012). We reconstruct the donor
pool for those two Georgia cases utilizing the counties with unsuccessful consolidation experiences
shown in Table 9. After dropping Athens, Clarke, and Muscogee because of subsequent successful
consolidations, along with two other counties with incomplete data, the new donor pool consists of
11 counties. Predictor balances for both Georgia counties with 11-county donor pools are presented
in Tables 10 and 11; they provide a good fit and are comparable to predictor balances from the full
donor pool.
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Institutionally, because the 11 counties have institutional contexts more similar to Clarke and
Richmond than others in the full donor pool, the results are improved from that perspective.
Mathematically, the 11 counties also are in the full donor pool for the main analysis because the
synthetic control method “selects” the “best” counties from the donor pool with the “best” weights
for variables to provide the “best” pre-treatment fit. Therefore, the synthetic controls from the
11-county donor pool should at least yield a pre-treatment fit no worse than the full donor pool.
Figures 9 and 10 display the SCM results for Athens-Clarke County and Augusta-Richmond
County. With the exception of population in Clarke County, the results with the 11 county donor
pool match the main findings. Post-consolidation ‘real’ levels tend to be below the synthetic control
estimates, confirming the negative effect of consolidation on economic development. However, as
with the main findings, the results do not always differ from random matching. Figures 11 and
12 display the percentage placebo tests.17 Consistent with the main findings for Clarke County,
consolidation’s effects differ from random pairing only for per capita personal income. For Richmond
County, again consistent with the main findings, no non-random effect is found for income. but
there is with population and employment. Based upon the SCM results and placebo tests, the
results are robust to including in the donor pool only those Georgia counties where attempts to
consolidate failed.
5.5 Urban-rural divide
The results thus far reveal that consolidation improved economic development in Lafayette Parish,
Louisiana, but reduced it in Clarke County and Richmond County, Georgia. However, the synthetic
control results do not distinguish between urban and rural areas. Different power structures post-
consolidation could ultimately affect economic development across urban and rural areas.18
For example, both immediately following the consolidation as well as in recent years, concerns
have been raised about the equity of the consolidation for the city and unincorporated areas in
Lafayette Parish. Schultz (1996) reports on concerns that city residents, who pay a majority of
parish taxes, would see their tax dollars going to support parish-wide initiatives. Additionally,
although the majority of tax dollars are generated within the city, rural representatives have the
17Appendix Figures A.4 and A.5 show the absolute difference placebo results.
18We are indebted to a referee for highlighting this point for us.
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same influence over how tax revenues are spent (Associated Press 2014). Consolidation affects the
political powers of urban and rural residents. Urban residents lobby for countywide funds to be
used in urban areas, while rural residents pursue policies in the best interest of their localities.
With potentially uneven political gains following consolidation, it is possible that economic ef-
fects are not evenly distributed across urban and rural areas. Emerging evidence from government
mergers in Europe suggests that merging results in larger, more politically powerful regions bene-
fiting at the expense of smaller, less politically powerful regions (Egger et al. 2018; Harjunen et al.
2019).
One possible way of addressing any urban-rural divides is to follow Egger et al. (2018) in using
nighttime luminosity data. With night light data from both before and after consolidation, it would
be possible to ask whether any observed economic gains are driven more by urban or rural areas.
However, given that 1992 marks both the referendum date and the start of the nightlight data, it
is not possible to identify pre-treatment light levels.
Instead of using nightlight data to explore urban-rural divides, we exploit data on rural popula-
tions for the 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 censuses. The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) of the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) contains counts of
the number of people in each county living in rural areas (Manson et al. 2018).19
To explore urban-rural divides following consolidation, we repeat the same synthetic control
procedure but with the rural to total population ratio as the outcome variable. Since the outcome
variable is reported every 10 years by the census, only three pre-treatment years (1970, 1980
and 1990) and two treatment years (2000 and 2010) are available to us. Tables B.1, B.2, and
B.3 in Appendix B contain the predictor balances for Lafayette, Clarke, and Richmond counties,
respectively.
Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays the results.20 For each case, the synthetic county is trending
downward, indicating general declining rural to total population ratios. For Lafayette Parish and
Clarke County, the downward trend accelerates following consolidation. Consolidation reduces
the percentages of people living in rural areas. Following consolidation in Richmond County, the
19The US Census defines rural areas as places with fewer than 2500 inhabitants.
20In previous figures, the vertical line represented both the treatment year and the year of the consolidation
referendum. However, with the rural to total population ratio available only every 10 years, the vertical line now
represents the year of the consolidation referendum. The first treatment year for each case is 2000.
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actual rural to total population ratio is above the synthetic. Although that finding suggests that
consolidation in Richmond County reduced a growing disparity in rural versus urban populations,
the pre-treatment fit is less than ideal. Overall, the SCM results for Lafayette Parish and Clarke
County are consistent with the findings in Egger et al. (2018) and Harjunen et al. (2019) of urban
areas benefiting at the expense of rural areas following consolidation.
6 Conclusion
Previous research has used time series and panel-data approaches to estimate the impact of city-
county consolidations on employment and business activity. Collectively, that small but growing
literature finds that consolidation has no impact on economic development. Using the synthetic
control method, we contribute to the literature by exploring the impact of consolidation on per
capita personal income, population and employment in Lafayette City-Lafayette Parish, Louisiana,
Athens-Clarke County, Georgia, and Augusta-Richmond County, Georgia. The results reveal that
the effects on economic development vary across consolidations.
Lafayette experienced strong increases in all three development outcomes following consolida-
tion. However, both Georgia consolidation cases did not improve economic conditions relative to
synthetic controls and, in some cases, the economies actually declined. The impact of consolida-
tion on development also can vary depending on the time horizon examined and how economic
progress is measured. For example, in the Augusta-Richmond case, although per capita personal
income initially fell after consolidation, it returns to its expected level within 10 years. Addi-
tionally, for the Augusta-Richmond case, the effect on per capita personal income is not different
from random matching, but consolidation affected population and total employment negatively. It
also is possible that the economic development failures in the two Georgia counties were caused
by events in unincorporated services or municipalities. However, Lafayette experienced the least
“complete” consolidation, while the two Georgia counties had saw more “complete” consolidations.
The Lafayette case is the most economically successful one of the three cases considered. Therefore,
it is hard to infer that the failures of the two Georgia consolidations can be explained in that way.
Overall, the results indicate that consolidation does not guarantee economic development, even
when consolidation is not triggered by some kind of crisis, budgetary or otherwise.
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Although Lafayette County experienced economic progress after consolidation, Athens-Clarke
County did not. Additionally, consolidation is not a guaranteed solution to crises. Based on
the negative findings with respect to the Augusta-Richmond case, present-day local governments
seeking consolidation as a way of reversing negative development trends, such as the proposed
Syracuse-Onondaga County, New York, consolidation, should be careful about viewing consolida-
tion as a panacea for development problems. For those city-county governments that do proceed
with consolidation, it is important to learn lessons from the cases studied herein.
Our reading of the literature surrounding governmental consolidations highlights that insuf-
ficient attention has been devoted to public choice considerations in the pre-treatment period.
Widespread opposition to consolidation has been analyzed extensively in the public administration
literature. No one seems to have recognized, though, how the special-interest politics necessary
to overcome widespread opposition sows the seeds of failure. In both Georgia cases, the politi-
cal dynamics of trying to overcome opposition to consolidation led to the introduction of charter
provisions (e.g., job and wage protections for public-sector employees) that doomed consolidation
to failure. In the Clarke County case, for example, the consolidation charter explicitly prohibited
the consolidated government from benefitting from economies-of-scale by reducing its workforce
(Durning 1995). Similarly, Richmond County locked in pre-consolidation tax burdens and service
levels in its consolidation charter. When contrasted with Lafayette Parish, where the absence of
strong opposition allowed the consolidation charter to focus on organizational issues and not main-
taining current rents, it is not surprising that Lafayette Parish was the only case to see significant
benefits from consolidation. In many respects, the Lafayette Parish consolidation is an example of
polycentric governance evolving organically (Ostrom et al. 1961).
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Summary statistics for Lafayette Parish and Louisiana
Lafayette Parish Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Per capita income ($) 30629 7170 17495 46581
Population 169875 29667 111926 222147
Total employment 113907 36255 48423 175259
Post-secondary (%) 22.41 4.14 13.50 29.00
Foreign born (%) 2.29 0.81 0.55 4.11
Black (%) 22.57 1.65 20.24 25.76
White (%) 75.43 2.94 69.37 78.75
Elderly population (%) 8.15 1.46 5.86 10.28
Government sector (%) 10.87 2.01 8.76 16.38
Retail sector (%) 16.21 3.01 10.55 19.37
Manufacturing sector (%) 4.68 0.59 3.64 5.59
Rural & urban code 2.76 0.44 2 3
Natural amenities scale -2.47 0 -2.47 -2.47
Louisiana Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Per capita income ($) 23073 6114 11369 57726
Population 63387 74408 7725 470047
Total employment 28262 40598 2469 275497
Post-secondary (%) 11.45 5.17 3.30 34.62
Foreign born (%) 1.19 1.16 0 11.04
Black (%) 29.77 13.46 3.73 69.03
White (%) 68.55 13.09 28.93 95.11
Elderly population (%) 11.70 2.89 4.22 18.51
Government sector (%) 20.72 9.78 8.76 86.70
Retail sector (%) 14.00 3.56 4.11 24.30
Manufacturing sector (%) 12.51 8.22 0.59 45.74
Rural & urban code 4.54 2.13 0 9
Natural amenities scale -0.37 0.88 -2.47 1.63
Table values reflect yearly averages from 1970-2010. The Louisiana subsection of the table includes the
average from all 49 counties. Thus, the total number of observations for Lafayette Parish is 41 while for the
State of Louisiana it is 2009.
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Table 2: Summary statistics for Clarke and Richmond counties and Georgia as a whole
Clarke County Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Per capita income ($) 24229 2807 18258 27847
Population 89569 15658 65494 117469
Total employment 61680 14903 36101 86058
Post-secondary (%) 36.40 3.52 27.80 39.80
Foreign born (%) 5.44 3.09 1.70 10.92
Black (%) 24.98 2.33 19.65 27.25
White (%) 70.33 5.57 61.89 79.61
Elderly population (%) 7.95 0.72 5.94 8.63
Government sector (%) 27.01 1.74 23.53 30.29
Retail sector (%) 15.40 3.43 10.06 21.00
Manufacturing sector (%) 17.44 5.28 7.84 24.52
Rural & urban code 3.49 0.87 3 5
Natural amenities scale -0.71 0 -0.71 -0.71
Richmond County Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Per capita income ($) 26490 3301 20049 31046
Population 187352 14449 154835 204164
Total employment 118140 16060 88766 135944
Post-secondary (%) 16.59 2.72 10.90 20.39
Foreign born (%) 3.10 0.49 1.54 3.59
Black (%) 42.78 7.32 29.93 54.17
White (%) 53.85 8.82 39.70 69.13
Elderly population (%) 9.56 1.46 6.64 11.33
Government sector (%) 32.48 4.14 28.16 41.14
Retail sector (%) 14.40 3.17 8.11 18.35
Manufacturing sector (%) 11.27 2.96 5.74 15.78
Rural & urban code 2 0 2 2
Natural amenities scale 0.02 0 0.02 0.02
Georgia Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Per capita income ($) 24133 6319 11251 73835
Population 52128 102394 2796 926038
Total employment 28747 80734 984 959204
Post-secondary (%) 12.10 7.12 2.10 48.58
Foreign born (%) 1.96 2.60 0 25.60
Black (%) 25.36 16.17 0 67.12
White (%) 72.53 16.16 18.87 99.99
Elderly population (%) 11.38 2.85 3.17 26.57
Government sector (%) 17.28 7.88 6.97 80.29
Retail sector (%) 13.38 3.87 3.84 29.70
Manufacturing sector (%) 21.60 11.84 0.98 59.87
Rural & urban code 5.08 2.64 0 9
Natural amenities scale 0.33 0.97 -1.42 3.11
Table values reflect yearly averages from 1970-2010. The Georgia subsection of the table includes the average
from all 122 counties. Thus, the total observations for Clarke and Richmond is 41 while for the State of
Georgia it is 5002.
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Table 3: Estimated synthetic control weights of counties with non-zero weight in the donor pool
for Lafayette Parish
Per capita income Weight
Jefferson 0.137
St. Charles 0.863
Population Weight
Jefferson 0.172
Lafourche 0.212
St. Mary 0.158
St. Tammany 0.398
Vernon 0.060
Total employment Weight
Jefferson 0.427
St. Charles 0.492
St. Mary 0.081
Table 4: Predictor balances for Lafayette Parish
Variables Lafayette Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 19.35 11.25 13.85 12.54
Foreign born (%) 1.80 1.60 1.88 2.53
Black (%) 21.25 23.84 16.05 21.09
White (%) 77.78 75.20 82.30 77.39
Elderly population (%) 6.98 6.62 7.56 6.99
Government sector (%) 11.95 12.72 20.42 12.42
Retail sector (%) 17.27 11.08 17.44 14.71
Manufacturing sector (%) 4.21 23.96 8.36 18.24
Rural & urban Code 2.91 2.87 2.33 2.35
Natural amenities scale -2.47 -0.06 0.50 0.10
Per capita income (1991) ($) 28204.60 28536.26
Population (1991) 168703 168800
Employment (1991) 110050 110880
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Table 5: Estimated synthetic control weights of counties with non-zero weight in the donor pool
for Clarke County
Per capita income Weight
Banks 0.332
Coffee 0.111
DeKalb 0.255
Liberty 0.219
Macon 0.025
Oglethorpe 0.035
Terrell 0.022
Population Weight
Baldwin 0.074
DeKalb 0.095
Fulton 0.028
Oconee 0.803
Total employment Weight
Bulloch 0.151
Columbia 0.559
DeKalb 0.004
Floyd 0.058
Fulton 0.058
Liberty 0.171
Table 6: Predictor balances for Clarke County
Variables Clarke Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 33.58 12.52 19.76 14.49
Foreign born (%) 2.72 1.94 1.01 2.60
Black (%) 23.08 23.15 15.74 23.12
White (%) 75.27 75.31 83.77 75.21
Elderly population (%) 7.53 8.49 9.10 6.29
Government sector (%) 27.89 26.93 18.37 27.87
Retail sector (%) 15.51 11.63 9.06 13.66
Manufacturing sector (%) 22.12 21.64 13.67 15.45
Rural & urban code 4 5.38 4.71 3.25
Natural amenities scale -0.71 -0.27 -0.72 0.72
Per capita income (1989) ($) 26457.93 25359.09
Population (1989) 88058 87679
Employment (1989) 62323 62577
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Table 7: Estimated synthetic control weights of counties with non-zero weight in the donor pool
for Richmond County
Per capita income Weight
Burke 0.149
Clayton 0.128
DeKalb 0.331
Peach 0.202
Tattnall 0.191
Population Weight
Chatham 0.428
DeKalb 0.098
Dougherty 0.163
Fulton 0.026
Liberty 0.285
Total employment Weight
Chatham 0.375
Dougherty 0.303
Fulton 0.071
Houston 0.096
Liberty 0.154
Table 8: Predictor balances for Richmond County
Variables Richmond Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 14.95 15.68 15.52 14.83
Foreign born (%) 2.93 2.44 2.56 2.01
Black (%) 37.81 35.87 37.98 38.42
White (%) 59.86 62.61 59.80 59.83
Elderly population (%) 8.67 8.71 8.00 8.37
Government sector (%) 34.66 17.45 34.04 31.37
Retail sector (%) 15.34 14.90 14.35 14.91
Manufacturing sector (%) 13.17 15.77 11.58 12.64
Rural & urban code 2 3.06 3.17 2.99
Natural amenities scale 0.02 -0.28 1.08 0.77
Per capita income (1994) ($) 27195.28 28585.79
Population (1994) 200027 210576
Employment (1994) 128276 136657
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Table 9: City-county consolidation referenda in the State of Georgia
City/County Failed Referenda Successful Referenda 11 Counties
Albany/Dougherty County 1954/1956 Y
Athens/Clarke County 1966/1969/1972/1982 1990
Augusta/Richmond County 1971/1974/1976/1988 1995
Brunswick/Glynn County 1969/1987 Y
Columbus/Muscogee County 1962 1970
Conyers/Rockdale County 1989 Y
Cusseta/Chattahoochee County 2003
Douglasville/Douglas County 1994 Y
Georgetown/Quitman County 2006
Griffin/Spalding County 1991/1997 Y
Gainesville/Hall County 2001 Y
Hawkinsville/Pulaski County 2000
Lakeland/Lanier County 1986
Macon/Bibb County 1933/1960/1972/1976 Y
Metter/Candler County 1994 Y
Preston/Webster County 2008
Savannah/Chatham County 1973 Y
Statenville/Echols County 2008
Tifton/Tift County 1984 Y
Waycross/Ware County 1998 Y
Sources: Murphy (2012), Durning et al. (2004), and Campbell et al. (2004).
Table 10: Predictor balances for Clarke County - 11 county donor pool
Variables Clarke Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 33.58 13.12 14.18 12.73
Foreign born (%) 2.72 1.32 1.20 1.40
Black (%) 23.08 37.86 25.74 25.54
White (%) 75.27 61.32 73.51 73.51
Elderly population (%) 7.53 8.62 10.25 8.27
Government sector (%) 27.89 21.21 17.58 16.79
Retail sector (%) 15.51 16.23 17.20 15.63
Manufacturing sector (%) 22.12 18.18 20.85 24.76
Rural & urban code 4 3.74 4.21 2.50
Natural amenities scale -0.71 0.32 1.79 0.49
Per capita income (1989) ($) 26405 26336
Population (1989) 86518 84891
Employment (1989) 61443 61446
27
Table 11: Predictor balances for Richmond County - 11 county donor pool
Variables Richmond Synthetic Synthetic Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 14.95 13.88 14.49 14.87
Foreign born (%) 2.93 1.20 1.99 1.88
Black (%) 37.81 33.68 33.18 37.63
White (%) 59.86 65.41 65.39 61.08
Elderly population (%) 8.67 9.00 10.55 10.73
Government sector (%) 34.66 16.98 17.18 17.89
Retail sector (%) 15.34 16.68 16.90 17.30
Manufacturing sector (%) 13.17 20.51 17.06 14.76
Rural & urban code 2 2.27 3.32 2.81
Natural amenities scale 0.02 0.58 1.52 1.67
Per capita income (1994) ($) 27268 29396
Population (1994) 200402 203478
Employment (1994) 125827 134540
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Figure 1: Lafayette and Louisiana map
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Figure 2: Clarke (Athens), Richmond (Augusta) and State of Georgia map
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Figure 3: Lafayette Parish and its synthetic
31
Figure 4: Placebo tests of Lafayette Parish (percentage)
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Figure 5: Clarke County and its synthetic
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Figure 6: Placebo tests of Clarke County (percentage)
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Figure 7: Richmond County and its synthetic
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Figure 8: Placebo tests of Richmond County (percentage)
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Figure 9: Clarke County and its synthetic (11 county donor pool)
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Figure 10: Richmond County and its synthetic (11 county donor pool)
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Figure 11: Placebo tests of Clarke County (percentage, 11 county donor pool)
39
Figure 12: Placebo tests of Richmond County (percentage, 11 county donor pool)
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A Appendix: Placebo tests with absolute difference
Figure A.1: Placebo tests of Lafayette Parish
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Figure A.2: Placebo tests of Clarke County
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Figure A.3: Placebo tests of Richmond County
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Figure A.4: Placebo tests of Clarke County (11 County Donor Pool)
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Figure A.5: Placebo tests of Richmond County (11 county donor pool)
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B Appendix: Urban-rural divide
Table B.1: Rural population ratio predictor balances for Lafayette County
Variables Lafayette Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 18.83 14.44
Foreign born (%) 1.62 1.62
Black (%) 21.45 21.40
White (%) 77.63 77.61
Elderly population (%) 6.97 8.41
Government sector (%) 12.57 15.99
Retail sector (%) 17.34 17.11
Manufacturing sector (%) 4.46 14.37
Rural & urban code 2.67 2.34
Natural amenities scale -2.47 -0.35
5 counties in the donor pool have non-zero weight.
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Table B.2: Rural population ratio predictor balances for Clarke County
Variables Clarke Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 33.43 20.18
Foreign born (%) 2.89 3.00
Black (%) 23.14 22.89
White (%) 75.08 75.00
Elderly population (%) 7.49 6.14
Government sector (%) 28.02 27.30
Retail sector (%) 15.39 14.39
Manufacturing sector (%) 21.28 15.50
Rural & urban code 3.67 1.99
Natural amenities scale -0.71 0.05
4 counties in the donor pool have non-zero weight.
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Table B.3: Rural population ratio predictor balances for Richmond County
Variables Richmond Synthetic
Post-secondary (%) 14.33 18.05
Foreign born (%) 2.71 2.65
Black (%) 36.44 36.52
White (%) 61.49 61.69
Elderly population (%) 8.37 8.33
Government sector (%) 36.39 27.09
Retail sector (%) 14.72 14.67
Manufacturing sector (%) 13.23 11.47
Rural & urban code 2 1.99
Natural amenities scale 0.02 0.87
4 counties in the donor pool have non-zero weight.
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Figure B.1: Rural to total population ratio synthetic control analysis
Top row: Lafayette Parish synthetic control analysis and its placebo test; middle row: Clarke
County synthetic control analysis and its placebo tests; bottom row: Richmond County synthetic
control method and its placebo tests.
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